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Poverty reduction is in the news for both the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. The IMF website says:
In September 1999, the objectives of the IMF’s concessional lending were
broadened to include an explicit focus on poverty reduction in the con-
text of a growth oriented strategy. The IMF will support, along with the
World Bank, strategies elaborated by the borrowing country in a Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
For its part, the World Bank headquarters has built into its lobby wall the
slogan “our dream is a world free of poverty.” In a joint statement issued by
the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund in April 2001, they declared poverty “the greatest
challenge facing the international community” and an issue concerning
which “the Bank and Fund have an important role to play” (World Bank
and International Monetary Fund 2001, 2).
The recent East Asian currency crisis and its aftershocks in other coun-
tries generated intense concern about how the poor were faring under struc-
tural adjustment programs supported by the Bank and the IMF. The
poverty issue is so red-hot that IMF and World Bank staﬀbegan to feel that
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At the same time, there has been a long-standing criticism from the left
of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs as disproportion-
ately hurting the poor:
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank arrive
in southern countries, corporate proﬁts go up, but so do poverty and suf-
fering. Decades of promises that just a little more “short-term” pain will
bring long-term gain have exposed the IMF and World Bank as false
prophets whose mission is to protect those who already control too much
wealth and power.
A report published today by the World Development Movement (WDM)
shows that the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) new Poverty Re-
duction Strategies are acting as barriers to policies beneﬁting the world’s
poorest people.
Many developing countries suﬀered . . . sustained increases in prosperity,
accompanied by dramatic increases in inequality and child poverty . . .
under the auspices of IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes.
In country after country, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have re-
versed the development successes of the 1960s and 1970s, with . . . mil-
lions sliding into poverty every year. Even the World Bank has had to ac-
cept that SAPs have failed the poor, with a special burden falling on
women and children. Yet together with the IMF it still demands that de-
veloping countries persist with SAPs.
This paper examines the eﬀect of IMF and World Bank adjustment lend-
ing on poverty reduction.1 I brieﬂy examine the eﬀect of IMF and World
Bank adjustment lending on growth and ﬁnd no eﬀect (suitably instru-
menting for adjustment lending), which is in line with the previous long and
inconclusive literature. My main result is that IMF and World Bank ad-
justment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty, that is, the amount
of change in poverty rates for a given amount of growth. This means that
economic expansions beneﬁt the poor less under structural adjustment, but
at the same time economic contractions hurt the poor less. What could be
the mechanisms for such a result?
There could be several possible explanations. I ﬁrst speculate that IMF
and World Bank conditionality may be less austere when lending occurs
during an economic contraction, whereas conditionality may require more
macro adjustment during an expansion. If macro adjustment dispropor-
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1. I follow the convention of using adjustment lending, structural adjustment, structural ad-
justment lending, and structural adjustment programs as interchangeable terms. Later I distin-
guish between structural adjustment lending and structural adjustment policies.tionately hurts the poor—say, because ﬁscal adjustment, for example, is im-
plemented through increasing regressive taxes like sales taxes or decreasing
progressive spending like transfers—then we get the result that IMF and
World Bank adjustment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty. Ad-
justment lending could even include an explicit ﬁscal insurance mechanism,
such as an increase in subsidies, that cushions the eﬀect of contractions on
the poor but is accompanied by a reduction in subsidies in times of expan-
sion. We can test this hypothesis explicitly by evaluating the behavior of ﬁs-
cal policy and macro policy variables during expansions and contractions,
with or without adjustment lending.
A nearly opposite hypothesis is that IMF and World Bank conditional-
ity may itself cause an expansion or contraction in aggregate output—de-
pending on the composition of the structural adjustment package—but not
aﬀect the poor very much. This view would see the poor as mainly deriving
their income from informal sector and subsistence activities, which are not
aﬀected much by ﬁscal policy changes or adjustments in macro policies.
Structural adjustment packages usually imply that some previously favored
formal-sector activities must contract while other formal-sector activities
newly favored can expand. The net eﬀect may be overall contraction or ex-
pansion, depending on the initial sizes of the declining and expanding sec-
tors and the speciﬁc policy measures in the structural adjustment package.
However, if the poor are not tightly linked to either the expanding or the
contracting formal sector, then the amount of poverty change for a given
amount of output change may not be very high under structural adjust-
ment. An expansion or contraction in the absence of adjustment lending,
on the other hand, may reﬂect economy-wide factors that lift or sink all
boats.
IMF and World Bank adjustment programs typically force the govern-
ment to make adjustments in a few highly visible macroeconomic indica-
tors, which again aﬀect mainly the formal sector. On the other hand, a
home-grown reform program (for example, that of China over the last two
decades, with only three adjustment loans in the 1980s and none in the
1990s) would generally include a more sweeping transformation of incen-
tives that aﬀect the formal and informal sectors alike.
11.1 Data and Concepts for Paper
I have data for 1980–98 on all types of IMF lending and on World Bank
adjustment lending. International Monetary Fund lending includes stand-
bys,  extended arrangements, Structural Adjustment Facilities, and En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (recently renamed Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Facilities). The latter two kinds of operations are
concessional for low-income countries. World Bank adjustment lending in-
cludes structural adjustment loans, sectoral structural adjustment loans,
IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 363and structural adjustment credits (the latter is concessional for low-income
countries). The data are reported in the year that the loans are approved.
Hence, my data take the form of a number of new World Bank and IMF ad-
justment loans approved each year. For any time period I consider in this
paper, I consider the average number of new World Bank and IMF adjust-
ment loans per year.
Conditionality associated with these loans is well known: macroeco-
nomic conditions like reduced budget deﬁcits, devaluation, and reduced do-
mestic credit expansion, and structural conditions like freeing controlled
prices and interest rates, reducing trade barriers, and privatizing state en-
terprises. Although the IMF is associated more with the former and the
World Bank with the latter, in practice neither will proceed with an adjust-
ment loan unless the other is satisﬁed with progress on its area of responsi-
bility. Of course, there will be variation across adjustment loans in exactly
what policy conditions are imposed, but it is still an interesting question to
ask what the impact of adjustment lending is on average—just as innumer-
able IMF and World Bank internal studies have done.
For data on poverty, I use an updated version of Ravallion and Chen’s
(1997) database on poverty spells. These authors were careful to choose
spells and countries for which the deﬁnition of poverty was constant and
comparable over time and across countries. The source of the data is house-
hold surveys. They report the proportion of the population that is poor at
the poverty line of $2 per day at the beginning of and the end of the spell
(they also report the poverty rates for a poverty line of $1 per day, but I
choose to use the former because many countries have a zero initial value at
$1 per day). They also report the Gini coeﬃcients at the beginning and the
end and the mean income in the household survey at the beginning and the
end. They report data on 155 spells for sixty-ﬁve developing countries (table
11.1 gives the countries and numbers of spells for each). The spells are quite
short (median length three years), so I interpret them more as cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations in mean consumption and poverty rather than as long-run tenden-
cies in growth and poverty reduction. Table 11.1gives the descriptive statis-
tics for all the data.
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Table 11.1 Descriptive Statistics on Variables Used
Mean Initial Adjustment
Change in Consumption Initial Poverty Loans
Poverty Growth Gini Rate Year
Mean 6.0% –1.1% 39.5 41.2 0.62
Median –0.1% 0.0% 39.5 36.3 0.50
Std. dev. 31.5% 11.1% 11.1 29.6 0.60
N 149 155 155 154 15011.2 Results on Adjustment Lending and Poverty Reduction
Following Ravallion (1997), I regress the change in poverty rate on
growth of mean income and the interaction of growth of mean income with
the Gini coeﬃcient. The idea of this speciﬁcation is that if the poor have a
low share in existing income (high Gini), they will likely have a low share in
newly created income (low growth elasticity of poverty reduction). I also in-
clude the level of the initial Gini for completeness. To test the eﬀect of IMF
and World Bank adjustment lending, I include the variable measuring num-
ber of adjustment loans per year during the poverty spell and also interact
this variable with growth.
There is the well-known selection bias problem with World Bank and
IMF lending. This lending goes to countries that are in trouble, and this
trouble could include initial high poverty rates. We could even imagine that
World Bank and IMF programs go to countries that are more likely to re-
duce poverty rapidly. With these concerns in mind, I instrument for World
Bank and IMF lending. I follow the practice of the foreign aid literature in
using dummies that measure friends of inﬂuential donors, including a
dummy for Central America, one for Egypt, and one for Franc Zone coun-
tries. I also include continent dummies as instruments for lending, because
both the World Bank and IMF have a diﬀerent department for each conti-
nent, and these diﬀerent departments may have diﬀerent propensities to
make loans. I also include initial income as an instrument of adjustment
loan frequency.
With the same set of instruments, I also tested the direct eﬀect of ad-
justment lending on growth, not controlling for any other factors. In line
with a long and inconclusive literature, I found no systematic eﬀect of ad-
justment lending on growth. (A recent paper by Przeworski and Vreeland
[2000] reviews the long inconclusive literature on the IMF, whereas they
themselves find a negative eﬀect controlling for selection bias. Some in-
ternal World Bank and IMF studies have found positive eﬀects of their
programs on growth. I do not intend to make the eﬀect of structural ad-
justment on growth a major focus of the paper, because structural adjust-
ment would of course alleviate poverty if it raised growth and worsen it if
it lowered growth.) Of course, behind this zero average result is concealed
a set of expansions and contractions that depended in part on the partic-
ulars of the adjustment program in each country and time period. In gen-
eral, we would expect that an adjustment program would disfavor some
sectors that were previously artificially protected or subsidized and favor
other sectors that benefit from a change in relative prices in their favor.
Whether expansion or decline dominates depends in part on the relative
sizes of the expanding and declining sectors (as pointed out by Rauch
[1997]).
IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 365The result on expansions strongly reducing the rate of poverty—or out-
put crises raising the rate of poverty—is familiar from other studies (Raval-
lion and Chen 1997; Dollar and Kraay 2000; Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire
2000; Lustig 2000; Ravallion 2000). Without controlling for other variables,
the mean growth elasticity of poverty is about 1.9 (table 11.2).
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction term between the Gini co-
eﬃcient and the growth rate also conﬁrms the Ravallion (1997) and Bruno,
Ravallion, and Squire (2000) result (table 11.2). Ten percentage points
higher Gini will lower the growth elasticity of poverty by 0.6 percentage
points. A not-often-noticed implication of this result is that the poor will be
hurt less by output contraction in a highly unequal economy than in a rela-
tively equal one, simply because the poor have a low share of output to be-
gin with. The initial Gini also has a direct negative eﬀect on the change in
poverty, suggesting a reversion to greater equality if a country begins highly
unequal.
The new result in this paper is that, although adjustment lending has no
direct eﬀect on poverty reduction, it has a strong interaction eﬀect with eco-
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Table 11.2 Regression Results on Change in Poverty, Growth, and Adjustment Programs
Ordinary Least  Ordinary Least  Two-Stage Least 
Squares: Regression 1 Squares: Regression 2 Squares: Regression 3
Variable Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
C 0.039 1.82 0.319 4.68 0.381 4.23
GROWTH –1.892 –8.24 –5.481 –8.27 –5.452 –4.67
GINI1 –0.006 –3.83 –0.006 –3.65
PROGRAM –0.019 –0.62 –0.114 –1.31
GROWTH*GINI1 0.058 3.27 0.057 2.68
GROWTH*PROGRAM 1.790 7.37 2.027 3.49
N 149 144 126
Variable deﬁnitions
GROWTH Log rate of growth per annum in mean of household survey
GINI1 Initial Gini coefﬁcient
PROGRAM Number of IMF/World Bank adjustment loans initiated per annum
CENTAM Dummy for Central America
FRZ Dummy for Franc Zone
EGYPT Dummy for Egypt and Israel
SSA Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa
LAC Dummy for Latin America
ECA Dummy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
EASIA Dummy for East Asia
LGDPPC Log of initial per capita income (Summers-Heston)
Notes: Dependent variable: Log rate of change per annum in percent of population below $2 per day. In-
struments for PROGRAM: CENTAM EASIA EGYPT FRZ SSA LAC ECA GROWTH, CENTAM ×
GROWTH, EASIA ×  GROWTH, FRZ ×  GROWTH, EGYPT ×  GROWTH, SSA ×  GROWTH,
GINI1 × GROWTH, LAC × GROWTH, ECA × LGDPPC.nomic growth (table 11.2).2 Thea bsolute value of the growth elasticity of
poverty declines by about two points for every additional IMF or World
Bank adjustment loan per year. The results are strong either in ordinary least
squares (OLS) or instrumenting for World Bank and IMF programs with the
instruments shown. The instruments for selection bias are plausibly exoge-
nous, and they do a suﬃciently good job explaining World Bank and IMF
programs that I still obtain a signiﬁcant result when using these instruments.
This means that the poor beneﬁt less from expansions during a structural
adjustment program than in expansions without an adjustment program,
while they are at the same time hurt less by contractions. Expansion under
adjustment lending is less pro-poor, whereas contraction under adjustment
lending is less anti-poor. The welfare of the poor may have increased from
the income-smoothing eﬀect of adjustment lending.
On the other hand, it is disappointing that the poor do not share fully in
growth in those cases in which there are recoveries that accompany adjust-
ment lending. Because the World Bank and the IMF ultimately wish to re-
store growth in the economies to which they make adjustment loans, it is
worrisome that positive growth has less of a poverty-reducing impact with
high World Bank IMF involvement.
Figure 11.1 illustrates the results. Countries with a low level of adjust-
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2. IMF (1999) found that “In seven SAF/ESAF countries for which data are available,
poverty rates declined by an average of 20 percent under IMF-supported adjustment pro-
grams, implying an average annual reduction of 5.3 percent.” This study did not control for
mean growth.
Fig. 11.1 Contractions and expansions, with varying levels of inequality and
adjustment lendingment lending (AL) as measured by PROGRAM and low inequality have
both greater increases in poverty during contraction and greater falls in
poverty during expansions than do countries with a high level of IMF and
World Bank lending and high inequality. (The terms high and low AL here
simply mean the upper and lower 50 percent of the sample as measured by
the number of programs per year; expansion is the average of all increases
in mean income, and contraction is the average of all decreases in mean in-
come).
Another way of illustrating the weakened link between growth and
poverty reduction with high inequality and high adjustment lending is to
calculate the number of perverse outcomes in quartiles of the sample de-
ﬁned by high and low inequality and high and low adjustment lending. A
perverse outcome is deﬁned as either a mean expansion with an increase in
poverty or a mean contraction with a decrease in poverty. Such perverse
outcomes are rare except in the case in which both inequality and adjust-
ment lending are high, when they account for 27 percent of the sample (ﬁg-
ure 11.2).
What is the marginal impact on poverty of IMF and World Bank adjust-
ment loans? If we specify a counterfactual of zero adjustment lending to all
countries in the sample, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the actual adjustment
loans on the number of poor was a net increase of 14 million. This repre-
sents an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the population-weighted av-
erage poverty rate in the sample. The outcome reﬂects the net eﬀect of an
increase in the number of poor compared to the counterfactual of no
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Fig. 11.2 Probability of perverse poverty-growth outcomes depending on level of
inequality and adjustment lendingadjustment loans in growing countries like India,3 whereas there was a de-
crease in poverty compared to the counterfactual in contracting countries
like Russia and Ukraine. The unweighted median change in the poverty rate
associated with adjustment loans is 0.0.
Table 11.3 uses the coeﬃcients from regression (2) to calculate the
poverty elasticity with respect to growth at diﬀerent levels of the Gini co-
eﬃcient and adjustment loans per year (AL). The middle cell is close to us-
ing the average value for Gini and AL, and we reproduce the familiar elas-
ticity of 2. However,  there is great ﬂuctuation around this average for
diﬀerent measures of the Gini and AL. If there are no adjustment loans and
inequality is very low, then poverty is extremely elastic with respect to
growth (3.8). China in 1990–92 is an example of an observation that would
approximately fall in this cell. At the other extreme, a highly unequal coun-
try receiving adjustment loans sees no eﬀect of growth or contraction on
poverty. Colombia in 1995–96 is an example of a country that would
roughly ﬁt in this cell.
I performed several robustness checks on these results. First, I looked for
asymmetries between expansion and contraction in both growth eﬀects
and the interaction term with adjustment lending. I found no evidence for
any asymmetries—the interaction term between adjustment lending and
growth remains statistically signiﬁcant in the separate samples of expan-
sions and contractions.
Second, I added the initial poverty rate both in levels and as an interac-
tion term. The initial poverty rate enters with a negative sign in levels—in-
dicating some tendency of poverty to revert to the mean—but it leaves the
signiﬁcance of the interaction term between adjustment lending and growth
unchanged.
Third, I entered the mean household consumption from the household
survey, both in levels and as an interaction term with growth. It left the co-
eﬃcient on the growth and adjustment program interaction unchanged in
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3. Even though India and China received only a small number of adjustment loans (in
China’s case, all in the 1980s), removal of even this small number of loans still has a large eﬀect
because of their large populations.
Table 11.3 Poverty Elasticities with Respect to Growth for Different Gini
Coefﬁcients and Adjustment Loan Intensity
Number of Adjustment Loans
Gini coefﬁcient 0 0.5 1
30 –3.8 –2.7 –1.7
45 –2.9 –1.9 –0.9
60 –2.1 –1.0 0.0
Note: Number of adjustment loans is average per year during survey period.magnitude and signiﬁcance, whereas the mean household consumption
was not signiﬁcant either in levels or as an interaction term with growth.
Fourth, one might think that what matters is the total size of the adjust-
ment loan. I try controlling for the ﬂow of resources under IMF and World
Bank loans in addition to the number of loans. The interaction of this re-
source ﬂow with growth is insigniﬁcant, whereas the signiﬁcance of the in-
teraction between number of adjustment loans and growth remains signiﬁ-
cant.
Fifth, there is a common conception that the content of IMF and World
Bank conditions has changed over time, away from straight macroeco-
nomic adjustment and toward more structural reform that may have helped
the poor more. A priori, this is unlikely to be an important factor, because
the bulk of the poverty spells in my sample start after the mid-1980s (only
13.5 percent of the sample has a start date before 1986). This was after the
IMF had moved from pure standby operations to longer-term adjustment
lending, and the World Bank always stressed structural measures. In any
case, I ﬁnd that if I split the sample into the period before and after 1989,
which is the median start date of the poverty spells in the sample, there is no
diﬀerence in results between the two subperiods.
Sixth, I try omitting transition countries from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. I ﬁnd no change in the pattern of results.
Given all the interest in currency crises, I examine the four currency cri-
sis cases that are in the present sample: Mexico (1989–95), Indonesia
(1996–99), Russia (1996–98), and Thailand (1996–98). All of them had at
least one adjustment loan per year during the period before and during the
crisis (table 11.4). Growth was negative in all cases, but the increases in
poverty were fairly modest except for Indonesia. We should not make much
out of four data points in a sample of 126 observations (and certainly there
are too few data to dummy them out as a group), but it is still interesting to
see if we can explain the diﬀerential poverty response to currency-output
crises with the regression. We can understand Mexico’s low poverty-growth
elasticity as reﬂecting its high inequality and its receipt of adjustment loans.
Thailand’s near-zero poverty-growth elasticity could be rationalized as a
consequence of its high adjustment intensity and its relatively average rate
of inequality. Indonesia ﬁts the story with a slightly below average elasticity
associated with low inequality but relatively intense adjustment lending.
Russia is an outlier, with a high elasticity despite an extraordinarily high
number of adjustment loans per year.
11.3 Testing the Countercyclicality of Adjustment Lending
One possible explanation for the poverty-smoothing eﬀect of adjustment
lending may be that conditionality on macro adjustment is tougher during













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5deepening a contraction with excessive austerity. If the poor disproportion-
ately suﬀer from austerity, then in contractions they will suﬀer less for a
given rate of mean income decline, while, conversely, they will do less well
for a given rate of growth in expansions. Second, the principal means of ﬁs-
cal adjustment under adjustment programs during expansions may be
through regressive taxation measures like sales taxes, which lower the ben-
eﬁts to the poor of mean income growth. Third, World Bank and IMF lend-
ing programs may explicitly include “social safety nets” that cushion the
eﬀect of a contraction on the poor, whereas these transfers may be reduced
during expansions. I will ﬁrst test for countercyclicality of these variables
and then test their eﬀect on the poverty rate.
Table 11.5 tests the countercyclicality of adjustment lending by present-
ing means of macro and ﬁscal policy variables for quartiles of the sample
divided between expansions and contractions and between high and low
adjustment lending. We ﬁnd some evidence for countercyclicality of ad-
justment lending. Inﬂation is above average during contractions under high
adjustment lending, suggesting that conditions on monetary growth and
domestic credit expansion may be less tough if the economy is otherwise ex-
periencing a contraction. (There could also be reverse causation from
above-average inﬂation to economic contraction, but then why does this not
show up under low adjustment lending?) Most interesting of all, transfers
are signiﬁcantly above average during contractions under adjustment lend-
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Table 11.5 Deviations of Policy Variables from Long-Run Averages under Expansions and
Contractions with Different Levels of Adjustment Lending (t-statistics in italics)
Expansion and Expansion and Contraction and Contraction and
High-Adjustment Low-Adjustment High-Adjustment Low-Adjustment
Variable Lending Lending Lending Lending
Macro Policies (Log Deviations)
Black market  –6.7% –7.3% –6.2% 5.4%
premium  –1.61 –2.45 –1.09 0.94
Inﬂation –0.7% 0.4% 6.9% 6.3%
–0.72 0.21 2.63 0.61
Real exchange ratea –13.7% –4.1% –14.5% –0.3%
–4.90 –1.36 –3.68 –0.06
Real interest rate 0.0% 2.9% 2.5% –3.1%
0.02 0.94 0.64 –0.46
Fiscal Policies (% of GDP)
Budget surplus 0.28 0.67 0.63 0.18
0.39 2.10 1.40 0.26
Transfers –0.57 0.00 0.86 –0.18
–1.94 0.01 2.44 –0.45
Taxes on domestic  –0.12 0.32 –0.48 0.31
goods and services –0.63 1.84 –1.53 1.21
aNegative indicates depreciation.ing, whereas they are signiﬁcantly below average during high-AL expan-
sions; there is no such countercyclical behavior of transfers under low ad-
justment lending. Other macro and ﬁscal policy variables do not show sig-
niﬁcant deviations from the means in the quartile subsamples.
Table 11.6 does various tests of the equality of means across the quartiles
displayed in table 11.5. Under high adjustment lending, I conﬁrm that in-
ﬂation and transfers are signiﬁcantly higher under contractions than under
expansions, again reinforcing the possibility of countercyclicality of mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy under adjustment lending.
There are some other interesting diﬀerences in means. The black market
premium moves countercyclically under low adjustment lending—low dur-
ing expansions and high during contractions. Causation here could run in
both directions, but what is important for the poor is the pattern of cyclical
covariation. Adjustment lending eliminates this countercylicality, which
would tend to smooth consumption of the poor if they suﬀer dispropor-
tionately from high black market premiums.
The other strong pattern that emerges is that adjustment lending is asso-
ciated with a more depreciated real exchange rate, regardless of whether
mean consumption is expanding or contracting. This is no doubt because
devaluation is often a condition of IMF programs. There may also be re-
verse causation from currency collapses to the initiation of World Bank and
IMF adjustment loans. Devaluation itself may be expansionary or contrac-
tionary (Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay 2000), perhaps depending on the size of
the initial current account imbalance and the currency denomination of
public and private debt relative to the tradables intensity of those who owe
the debts.
So there is some evidence that adjustment lending has countercyclical
eﬀects in ways that may smooth the consumption of the poor. However, is
there direct evidence that these eﬀects account for the lower growth elastic-
ity of poverty under adjustment lending? Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
evidence that these policy variables are responsible for smoothing poverty
under adjustment lending. The three examples of variables for which ad-
justment lending altered the cycle—inﬂation, the black market premium,
and ﬁscal transfers—do not show any direct eﬀect on poverty, either di-
rectly or interacted with growth (table 11.7). Entering these variables leaves
the interaction eﬀect of growth and adjustment lending on poverty un-
changed.
Easterly and Fischer (2001) ﬁnd some evidence that inﬂation increases
poverty, when inﬂation is measured in absolute terms rather than relative to
country averages. They also ﬁnd that the poor are more likely than the rich
to mention inﬂation as a top national problem in opinion surveys. Because
of the diﬀerence in methodology, I do not think the results of table 11.7 con-
tradict the Easterly-Fischer results on the eﬀects of inﬂation on poverty. I
interpret the inﬂation deviation as a measure of the cyclical component of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.inﬂation that may be altered by IMF and World Bank adjustment lending.
This cyclical component of inﬂation doesn’t seem to have an eﬀect on the
log change in the poverty rate, in contrast to the negative eﬀect of very high
absolute inﬂation on the poor.
The message of table 11.7 is consistent with the alternative hypothesis
mentioned at the beginning of the paper. The kind of macroeconomic and
ﬁscal policy measures that the World Bank and IMF usually support may
themselves cause an expansion or contraction in the aggregate economy,
depending on the composition of adjustment packages. However, these
policies may not aﬀect the poor very much because the poor derive much of
their income from the informal sector or subsistence production. I do not
test this hypothesis directly, but I adduce a few illustrative bits of informa-
tion. First, I show that there is a strong cross-section association between
measures of the size of the informal sector (taken from Enste and Schneider
1998) and the poverty rate (using the same poverty data on percent below
$2 per day).4 The scatter diagram is presented in ﬁgure 11.3.
The statistical association is very strong, as shown in table 11.8. One per-
IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 375
4. I include Enste and Schneider’s informal sector size for the ten richest economies in the
world and assume their poverty rate is zero. The association is just as strong leaving out the
rich economies, however. I am grateful to Arup Banerjee for pointing out this data source and
the association between poverty rates and the size of the informal sector.
Table 11.7 Regression of Poverty Rate on Possible Mechanisms for Poverty Smoothing through
Adjustment Lending
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variable Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
C 0.010 1.00 0.006 0.64 0.020 1.46
GROWTH –5.086 –6.36 –4.252 –5.72 –7.654 –5.57
GINI1*GROWTH 0.076 4.35 0.055 3.20 0.127 4.21






N 99 91 65
New variables
PIDEV Deviation of log inﬂation from average 1980–98
BMPDEV Deviation of log black market premium from average 1980–98
TRANSFERS Deviation of transfers/GDP from average 1980–98
Notes: Dependent variable: log change in poverty rate. Method: two-stage least squares. Instrument list:
C GROWTH GINI1 CENTAM EASIA EGYPT SSA GROWTH, CENTAM × GROWTH, EASIA ×
GROWTH, EGYPT × GROWTH, SSA × GROWTH, LAC × GROWTH, FRZ × GROWTH, ECA
LGDPPC LAC ECA FRZ LPOP GROWTH, LPOP × GROWTH.Fig. 11.3 Association between poverty rate and share of informal sector
centage point more of the population below $2 a day is associated with 0.7
more percentage points of the population in the informal sector. This evi-
dence suggests that the poor are indeed in the informal sector.
This cross-section evidence is conﬁrmed with fragmentary data from
household surveys that show that the poor derive much of their income
from informal and subsistence income. I oﬀer a suggestive example from
Zambia and Burkina Faso in table 11.9. Self-employment income is ex-
tremely important for the poorest deciles in Zambia. The bias is less ex-
treme in Burkina Faso, but the poorest still have their earnings skewed to-
ward  self-employment income. These surveys are suggestive of the
importance of the informal sector for the poorest households, lending cre-
dence to the relative insulation of the poor from structural adjustment
measures.
Lipton and Ravallion (1995, 2601) stress that there is considerable het-
erogeneity within the urban informal sector, with an individual’s poverty
depending more on individual attributes like human capital than on any
economywide labor market distortion leading to the creation of an infor-
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Table 11.8 Regression of Informal Sector Share on Poverty Rate
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error t-statistic Prob.
C 16.10031 1.679363 9.587155 0.0000
POVERTY_RATE 0.690322 0.059128 11.67513 0.0000
R2 0.768765
Adjusted R2 0.763125
S.E. of regression 8.900320
Sum squared resid. 3247.843
Log likelihood –153.9921
Mean dependent var. 27.64651
S.D. dependent var. 18.28715




Notes: Dependent variable: INFORMAL_SHARE. Method: least squares. Included obser-
vations: 43.
Table 11.9 Sources of Income: Percent Share by Income Decile, 
from Poorest to Richest
Zambia Household Survey Burkina Faso Household Survey
Proﬁts and Proﬁts and
Income Self-Employment Self-Employment
Decile Income Wages Income Wages
1 100 0 425 8
29 9 1 32 68
39 4 6 21 79
46 7 3 3 1 98 1
54 5 5 5 1 78 3
61 7 8 3 1 58 5
71 2 8 8 1 88 2
81 1 8 9 2 17 9
91 0 9 0 2 77 4
10 36 64 46 54
Sources: Devarajan (2000).
mal sector. Other distortions may exclude the poor from taking advantage
of reforms under structural adjustment, like lack of access to credit. Van de
Walle (2000) shows evidence of lower return to formal-sector investments
(irrigation in her speciﬁc example) for the less educated. Lundberg and
Squire (2000) ﬁnd that the bottom quintile is the only quintile not to bene-
ﬁt from trade openness. The poor may be geographically isolated from the
formal-sector economy, which may be exacerbated by poor infrastructure.
Whatever the distortion or initial endowment at work, the individuals who
are poor may be ill placed to take advantage of new opportunities createdby structural adjustment programs, just as they may suﬀer less from the de-
struction of old opportunities enjoyed by protected sectors prior to struc-
tural adjustment.
The eﬀect of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs on
policies, as mandated from the top, is usually limited to a few highly visible
macroeconomic indicators—like the ﬁscal balance and devaluation (ex-
penditure-reducing and expenditure-switching policies). Again, these seem
more likely to aﬀect the formal than the informal sector. In economies
growing under home-grown reform programs, where government owner-
ship of the program creates stronger motivation for genuine change, the
transformation of incentives is likely to be economywide—stimulating
both the informal and formal sectors. China in the 1990s is a good example
of home-grown reform without adjustment lending, although it was open
to advice from international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs). China reduced the
percent living on less than $2 a day from 71 percent in 1990 to 50 percent in
1998. Chile 1987–1994 is another example of rapid reduction in poverty
with an indigenous reform program and very little adjustment lending. De-
spite high inequality, the percent living on less than $2 a day in Chile fell
from 31 in 1987 to 20 in 1994. El Salvador is an example of an economy go-
ing in the other direction, with economic expansion and intensive adjust-
ment lending, but seeing poverty actually increase over this period.
11.4 Conclusions
The results in this paper are suggestive that IMF and World Bank ad-
justment lending provides a smoothing of consumption for the poor, low-
ering the rise in poverty for a given contraction, but also lowering the fall in
poverty for a given expansion. Adjustment lending seems to play a similar
role to inequality in lowering the sensitivity of poverty to the aggregate
growth rate of the economy.
The lower sensitivity of poverty to growth under adjustment lending is
bad news during expansions and good news during contractions. If we
think of the normal steady state of the economy as being one of positive
growth, then adjustment lending is bad news for the growing economy; it
means the poor share less in the expansion of the economy. One might think
that adjustment lending happens only during non-steady-state output
crises. It could also be that adjustment lending hurts the poor in the short
run but helps them in the long run by raising growth. Unfortunately, there
is little evidence of adjustment lending’s raising growth in the long run. This
is a question that has been intensively studied, with few convincing results.
The bare facts are not supportive. There were thirty-six countries that the
IMF and World Bank gave ten or more adjustment loans over 1980–98. The
median growth rate of income per person in this group over the past two
decades was zero (which is also the median growth rate of the entire devel-
oping-country sample, and of the sample of poverty spells in this paper).
378 William EasterlyAdjustment lending has been so continuous for some economies that it is
hard to speak of it as purely a transitional phenomenon. This continual de-
pendence on the IFIs, requiring in some cases relief from past IFI loans, is
itself cause for concern. If adjustment loans had to be repeated ten times or
more, this clearly does not speak well of the eﬀectiveness of the treatment.
From a political economy point of view, lowering the sensitivity of
poverty to the aggregate growth rate could be dangerous because it gives the
poor less of a stake in overall good economic performance. This might in-
crease the support of the poor for populist experiments at redistributing in-
come.
These results could be interpreted to give support to either the critics or
the supporters of structural adjustment programs. To support the critics,
growth under structural programs is less pro-poor than in economies not
under structural adjustment programs. To back the supporters, contrac-
tions under structural adjustment hurt the poor less than contractions not
under structural adjustment programs.
The question that further research should pursue is why structural ad-
justment lending reduces the sensitivity of poverty to growth. Although
there is evidence that adjustment lending alters the cycle for some policy
variables, there is no evidence that these alterations aﬀect poverty.
I speculate that the poor depend more on the informal sector, which is not
directly aﬀected as much as the formal sector by economic reforms under
adjustment loans. More generally, the poor may be ill placed to take ad-
vantage of new opportunities created by structural adjustment reforms, just
as they may suﬀer less from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were
artiﬁcially protected prior to reforms. The poor may also beneﬁt more from
sweeping home-grown reform programs than those in which the govern-
ment reforms are limited to a few highly visible indicators constrained by
IMF and World Bank adjustment loans. A recent World Bank report on aid
and reform in Africa found no relationship between adjustment lending (or
aid more generally) and the development of such a broad consensus (De-
varajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001). As this report puts it, “successful re-
formers have consultative processes that result in a broad consensus for
reform.”
One distinction that should be made is between “structural adjustment
lending” and “structural adjustment policies.” This paper has tested the
eﬀect of the former but not the latter. There is considerable international
evidence that structural adjustment policies, like macroeconomic stabil-
ization, ﬁnancial development, openness to trade, and removal of price
distortions, improve growth potential—and thus strengthen poverty
reduction.5 However, the success of adjustment loans at changing policies
is very mixed. The tests for this paper found a strong eﬀect only for the real
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5. The literature on this subject is vast. See Easterly and Levine (2001) for a demonstration
that good policies matter for growth.exchange rate. The IMF noted in 1995 that the “record of achieving . . . low
inﬂation” under its programs in low-income economies “was at best mixed.”
Half of those with IMF programs had inﬂation go down and half had it go
up (Schadler 1995, 39). For example, Zambia had eleven adjustment loans
from 1985 to 1996, but it had inﬂation above 40 percent for every one of
those years except two. This pattern is part of the more general historical
record that foreign aid and adjustment lending have not discriminated
much between good and bad policies. As the World Bank (1998, 48) notes,
“there is a long legacy of failed adjustment lending where there was no
strong domestic constituency for reform.” It may be that structural adjust-
ment measures succeeded in changing only a few token indicators, like the
real exchange rate, that aﬀected mainly the formal sector, but left the econ-
omywide pattern of incentives otherwise untouched.
The results may not be so surprising in view of the recent vintage of the
concern for poverty in IMF and World Bank adjustment packages, well af-
ter the poverty spells that make up most of my sample. In other words, for
most of the period, IMF and World Bank adjustment lending was not de-
signed to reduce poverty directly, and so it is not surprising that they were
not unusually eﬀective at doing so. The results of adjustment lending may
change as the IFIs emphasize more poverty reduction under adjustment
lending. Alternatively, the results may suggest that adjustment loans are not
a very eﬀective vehicle for reducing poverty, and the IFIs and the govern-
ment would do better by directing resources toward programs that directly
target poverty. These could include income subsidies for the poor, infra-
structure targeted toward poor areas, improved access to credit (possibly
through microcredit schemes), subsidies for inputs to subsistence produc-
tion, and improved access to market information (such as through infor-
mation technology) for the poor.
An aggregate result like this is a useful guide for further research. Further
research should probably take the form of more detailed case studies like
those in Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren (2001). If we think of a matrix
that has on one dimension good or bad policies, and on the other dimen-
sion adjustment lending or not, we could examine cases from each of the
four cells. These cases could examine the interrelationship among adjust-
ment lending, country ownership, policy reform, targeted poverty mea-
sures, growth, and poverty reduction.
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Table 11A.1 Countries with Poverty Spells, 1980–99
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Introduction
William Easterly’s paper on the impact of International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment programs on poverty should
be troubling to most readers because he believes he has found evidence of
an adverse eﬀect of adjustment lending on the link between growth and
poverty. However, serious questions can be raised about his methodology
and the interpretation of his results.
This paper is about adjustment lending by the international ﬁnancial
institutions (IFIs); it is not about structural adjustment lending by those
institutions. The author inappropriately, in my view, uses results about
the former to criticize the latter. Easterly states that critics may conclude
“growth under structural adjustment programs is less pro-poor than in
economies not under structural adjustment programs.” On the other hand,
supporters of such programs may conclude that “contractions under struc-
tural adjustment hurt the poor less than contractions not under structural
adjustment programs.”
It is important to understand what he ﬁnds: (a) growth reduces poverty,
(b) adjustment lending has “no direct eﬀect on poverty reduction,” and (c)
adjustment lending “has a strong interaction eﬀect with economic growth,”
which means, in his words, that “the poor beneﬁt less from expansions dur-
ing a structural adjustment program than in expansions without an adjust-
ment program, while they are at the same time hurt less by contractions.” It
is the third statement that is the focus of the paper.
It is more surprising that Easterly ﬁnds a positive statistical association
between adjustment lending and dampening the eﬀect of growth on poverty
during downturns than that he ﬁnds a positive statistical association be-
tween adjustment lending and dampening of the eﬀect of growth on poverty
during an expansion. My prior would have been that adjustment lending
was associated with relatively bad times, and the lower the growth rate in
those bad times, the larger the impact on poverty.
The issue of the impact of adjustment lending on poverty is important.
For that reason we should hold research on this topic to a high standard.
The basic problem with this paper is that Easterly does not succeed in es-
tablishing the reason that an absence of adjustment lending should produce
a larger impact of growth on poverty. The reader is left with two alternative
explanations: First, adjustment lending does not aﬀect the very poor be-
cause they are more often part of the informal economy. This is interesting,
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nomics.but not very useful. Second, a distinction is made between home-grown re-
form programs and programs mandated from outside the country. This dis-
tinction is not well supported by the facts. International ﬁnancial institu-
tions do not require members to borrow from them. Members come to
them precisely when their policies have failed or continue to fail. It is East-
erly’s apparent lack of appreciation of this distinction that contributes to
his misunderstanding of the nature of the selection bias that undermines his
statistical results.
What is a Structural Adjustment Lending Program?
A major problem with Easterly’s paper is that it adopts a broad and mis-
leading deﬁnition of structural adjustment lending by the IFIs. It is wrong
to lump essentially all types of IMF lending together with various types of
World Bank structural adjustment lending for purposes examining the im-
pact of IFI structural adjustment lending programs. International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank lending to support structural adjustment in
member economies diﬀers from lending to support macroeconomic stabi-
lization. The former involves an attempt to attack some of the deeper prob-
lems that have aﬀected the performance of these economies. Easterly is
careful to distinguish in his conclusions between structural adjustment
lending and structural adjustment policies, but he is not careful in his sta-
tistical analysis to distinguish between adjustment lending and structural
adjustment lending, and he uses the two terms interchangeably in the main
body of his paper. This is unfortunate when much of the current debate is
about the structural content of IFI lending.
Easterly’s lending data go back to 1980, when the conditionality in most
IMF programs was aimed simply at macroeconomic stabilization and had
little to do with structural considerations. As is reported in the recent IMF
review of structural conditionality in programs (International Monetary
Fund 2001), less than one-ﬁfth of the upper credit tranche standby and ex-
tended arrangements approved in 1985 and 1986 had any performance cri-
teria related to structural measures. As a consequence, in its recent review
the IMF’s data on its structural conditionality do not start until 1987; the
big surge in such lending was after 1994. Goldstein (2001) also documents
this point.
It is true that by 1980 the IMF had its Extended Fund Facility (which
dates from 1974), but the Structural Adjustment Facility was not estab-
lished until 1986. It is also true that the World Bank has made structural ad-
justment loans for many years, but most of the loans for a good part of the
1980s were merely disguised balance-of-payments loans. In other words,
Easterly should have sorted out the true from the ersatz structural adjust-
ment loans from the Bretton Woods institutions before he started his statis-
tical analysis. It is not enough, in my view, just to split the sample at 1989.
Second, even in the case of lending by the IFIs that all would agree was
384 William Easterlyfocused primarily on achieving structural objectives, those objectives come
in various shapes and sizes. For example, what would we expect to be the
impact on poverty of a program directed at restructuring the ﬁnancial sys-
tem of a member country? We would expect very little impact one way or
another, but other factors (omitted variables) meanwhile may produce
Easterly’s statistical correlations. What about loans directed at reducing
pricing distortions or rationalizing tariﬀstructures? We would expect more
of an impact, and we should be interested in the sign, but we should ques-
tion whether the impact would be statistically similar across countries.
Third, structural adjustment lending has many diﬀerent objectives, de-
pending in large part on the circumstances of the members. Structural ad-
justment lending for a country in transition (Russia and Ukraine) diﬀers
from structural adjustment lending for an emerging-market economy (Ko-
rea or Thailand). Structural adjustment lending in Africa today also diﬀers
from such lending (primarily) to Latin American countries in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. It is misleading to expect that lending to countries in sub-
stantially diﬀerent amounts and circumstances will be associated with sim-
ilar eﬀects in a broad statistical analysis. Moreover, structural adjustment
programs diﬀer in size and in their degree of emphasis on structural adjust-
ment; a better variable to try to capture the impact of such programs would
be the size of the program in special drawing rights (SDR) or dollars per
capita rather than just the number of programs approved by the IMF and
World Bank executive boards. Easterly reports that he tried to control for
any interaction eﬀect with the absolute size of loans, but it was insigniﬁcant,
whereas the interaction eﬀect with the number of loans remained signiﬁcant.
This is puzzling, as is the fact that there was no multicollinearity problem in
the estimation. One is left wondering whether the statistical results are dom-
inated by a large number of small loans to a large number of small countries.
Fourth, it is important to worry about the contemporaneous impact of
adjustment lending on poverty and to try to design programs that at a min-
imum cushion those impacts, but any signiﬁcant positive payoﬀs from this
type of program, one would expect, would be felt with a considerable lag
after the lending occurs. Adjustment lending programs are not known as
sources of instant gratiﬁcation. Structural adjustment, in particular, is a
complex process that even at its most eﬀective normally has eﬀects over
time. Easterly compounds this problem by his use of “poverty spells” (pairs
of substantially similar poverty surveys) of diﬀerent lengths and treating
them as identical dependent variables. Moreover, as Easterly notes, in many
instances adjustment programs are of diﬀerent lengths, eﬀorts may not be
sustained, and the lending programs may be suspended or cancelled. One
might expect these diﬀerences to aﬀect the results. It is disturbing that a re-
searcher as serious and respected as Easterly did not take the time to reﬁne
his data.
In summary, my major criticism of this paper is that it combines apples,
IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 385oranges, grapes, tomatoes, pasta, potatoes, red meat, and raw ﬁsh. It is not
too surprising that the result is not particularly appetizing. We should be
surprised that there are any “statistically signiﬁcant” results at all.
Counterfactual and Other Methodological Issues
In addition to Easterly’s misleading categorization of IFI adjustment
lending programs, his paper raises serious methodological issues, some fa-
miliar to students of this literature and some less so. The familiar issue is the
potential bias in the selection of the countries that have and have not had
any or much lending from the IFIs. What we have is a problem of the coun-
terfactual or control group. It is unfortunate in this connection that the
reader is not provided with a full cross-classiﬁcation of so-called adjust-
ment lending with the “poverty spells.” We are told in passing that India and
China are countries that have had few or no such loans and Russia and
Ukraine had a large number.
I commented above about the inappropriate inclusion of lending to the
latter two countries in the sample, but how are we to think about China and
India? Calling China’s economic reform program “home-grown” is a dis-
tortion of the facts. Over the past twenty years, China has undergone a great
deal of structural adjustment, often under the close tutelage of the IFIs.
Moreover, China received three adjustment loans from the IFIs during the
1980s. China had two standby arrangements with the IMF in which the
Chinese authorities laid out in considerable detail their reform plans.1 In-
dia, on the other hand, has undergone very little structural adjustment, and
many observers wring their hands about the Indian situation. India had a
substantial IMF program in the early 1990s, and it is generally regarded as
a success.
My basic point is that Easterly does not seriously address the statistical
problem of selection bias; his use of instruments drawn from the foreign aid
literature does not do the trick. The issue is not which countries may have
had a political leg up to help to obtain IFI ﬁnancial assistance, but the na-
ture of their economic and ﬁnancial circumstances that drove them to seek
assistance from the IFIs. Building a convincing statistical counterfactual is
a complex issue, but researchers must try harder to come to grips with it in
studies of this nature.
Second, researchers know a lot about IFI programs, and it is troubling,
for example, when Easterly lists a number of speculations about what the
IMF or World Bank may “fear” about contractions, or what “may be” the
nature of a change in taxation that was part of a program, or what “may”
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1. Chile (1987–94) is another poor example of a home-grown adjustment program unsup-
ported by IFI lending. Chile economic programs during this period were drawn up in close co-
operation with the IMF and World Bank, and the only reason that they did not receive ﬁnan-
cial support from those institutions through most of that period was political.have been included with respect to social safety nets when these are facts
that are known or knowable.
Third, macroeconomic conditions have a lot to do with what is going on
in the background with adjustment programs, but the amount of macro-
economic analysis in this paper is limited to a look at the countercyclicality
of IFI lending. No attempt is made there to control for economic circum-
stances (for example, external ﬁnancial diﬃculties) in the actual statistical
tests; no attempt is made to diﬀerentiate trend from cycle. On the other
hand, Easterly was careful to split his sample between periods with con-
tractions and periods with expansions to see if there is a statistical diﬀer-
ence in his interaction term.
Fourth, it would be useful to know more about the 150 (more or less) data
points. Although Easterly summarizes the data, the reader would like to
know more in order to evaluate his results. He makes much of the distinc-
tion between “poverty spells” during which there are expansions and those
in which there are contractions in income or consumption. (Disconcert-
ingly, the two concepts are used interchangeably.) We are told that median
consumption growth is zero, the mean is –1.1 percent, and the standard de-
viation is 11.1 percent, but that is not a lot of information. Figure 11.2 pro-
vides summary information on perverse poverty-growth outcomes (expan-
sions associated with increases in poverty, or contractions associated with a
decline in poverty) sorted on the basis of the level of inequality and adjust-
ment lending. In the cell with high inequality and high adjustment lending,
27 percent of the observations are perverse. This strikes one as rather sig-
niﬁcant, but we are not told whether the perversity is evenly distributed be-
tween expansions and contractions.
Finally, Easterly tries to tease out of his data set information on four in-
stances of currency crisis: Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand. He
does not “make much” (his words) of the data points. Each case involved a
contraction (negative growth) and an above-average amount of adjustment
lending according to Easterly’s crude deﬁnition. He notes, almost in pass-
ing, that “the increases in poverty were fairly modest except for Indonesia.”
In fact, the ex post elasticities for the four cases range from –2.16 to 0.1,
compared with the estimated average of –1.9. Moreover, the mean of these
four observations is –1.1, three standard deviations below the mean in the
total sample. It would appear that on average in these four cases that in-
volved heavy doses of structural adjustment lending, the so-called damping
eﬀect of such lending, through whatever mechanism, was unusually pro-
nounced.
This type of gross cross-section analysis has provided policy makers with
valuable insights in the past, when the work is carefully done. One can ap-
preciate the challenge involved in enriching the data used for this type anal-
ysis, but in this case, too much useful and relevant information has been dis-
carded or ignored.
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What implications for policy should we draw from this paper?
First, Easterly generates a statistical result that adjustment lending ap-
pears to dampen the eﬀect of growth (expansion or contraction) on poverty
without, in my view, establishing a convincing story or mechanism that
might produce this eﬀect. He acknowledges that doing so is crucial to his
analysis, but the issue is not fully resolved by his paper. He ﬁnds that ad-
justment lending alters the cycle for some policy variables, but he also ﬁnds
no evidence that these alterations aﬀect poverty. Without a convincing
mechanism, one worries about correlation without causation.
Second, the author’s concluding remarks on the issue of a mechanism fo-
cus on the informal sector and suggests that adjustment lending is irrelevant
to poverty alleviation because the poor are largely found in the informal
sector. This is a rather narrow view of both poverty and adjustment lending.
It is one thing to think that adjustment in an economy, no matter how de-
ﬁned or supported, has a minimal direct and immediate impact on the in-
formal sector and, therefore, on poverty, but that is not the same as being
irrelevant. In the longer run, the overall eﬃciency of the economy does
matter because we expect that as a consequence of growth the poorest will
move from the informal sector to the formal sector.
Third, it is useful to be reminded that, even in cases of classical stabiliza-
tion programs that are supported by IFI lending, attention should be paid
to the impact on poverty. However, in some cases, a country has been living
beyond its means, and the growth of and, sometimes, even the level of ag-
gregate expenditure needs to be curbed or reduced to restore overall bal-
ance to the economy. If this occurs evenly across income classes, poverty
will increase. The question for the policy maker is whether the distribution
of expenditure canbe twisted even as the overall level or growth is adjusted.
It is a reasonable goal, and one that deserves attention, but the near-term
objective in programs undertaken in the context of overall economic stabi-
lization eﬀorts is to try to avoid expenditure cuts that have a disproportion-
ate impact on the poorest, even though, as Easterly concedes, these are “re-
cent vintage” concerns, and maybe not the best grounds for criticizing IFI
lending over the past twenty years.
Fourth, in structural adjustment programs, appropriately deﬁned, atten-
tion to details is even more important. It should not be diﬃcult to improve
the eﬃciency of existing programs ostensibly intended to assist the poorest
while reducing their overall cost, because too many of such programs are
not really directed at reducing poverty but rather at subsidizing the middle
class, if not the upper class. The challenge to do better is not always easy to
meet, in particular at a time of crisis, when the design phase of structural
programs is compressed. Nevertheless, we know what has to be done. Take,
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producing countries. From an overall eﬃciency standpoint, the cost of the
subsidy involved is often outrageous. Nevertheless, political leaders are re-
luctant to reduce the subsidy substantially and appeal to resistance by the
poor to justify their reluctance when the true political resistance comes
from a broader and more politically active segment of the population. The
objective should be to design programs to rationalize petroleum product
prices and use some of the ﬁscal savings to address more directly and eﬀec-
tively the needs of the poor, at the extreme, for example, via direct income
transfers.
Finally, do we conclude from Easterly’s paper that there should be more
or less structural adjustment lending by the IFIs? There is an active debate
on this issue, especially within the IMF, as we know from Goldstein (chap.
8 in this volume), although that debate focuses not so much on support for
structural adjustment as on which IFI should take the lead. On the basis of
this paper, we are justiﬁed in concluding that (a) the issue of the impact on
poverty and the poor needs to be further researched and (b) the overall
eﬀectiveness of such lending needs to receive greater scrutiny.
The author states that for many of the countries in his sample “adjust-
ment lending has been so continuous . . . it is hard to speak of it as purely a
transitional phenomenon.” Whether one is talking about macroeconomic
adjustment or structural adjustment properly deﬁned, prolonged access to
the IFIs is a problem for the countries because they are falling further be-
hind, for the IFIs themselves because they are failing in their missions, and
for the system as a whole because support for rational policies and instru-
ments is being undermined. This paper does not help to advance that wor-
thy agenda. It certainly does not add much to the debate when Easterly rests
part of his criticism of prolonged use on the fact that the median growth rate
of income per person in a group of thirty-six heavy IFI borrowers over the
period 1980–98 was zero because the median consumption growth per
household in his overall sample of sixty-four countries was also zero.
Easterly argues that “structural adjustment policies” promote poverty
reduction but implies that “structural adjustment lending” by the IFIs in
support of those policies is counterproductive. This is a rather curious dis-
tinction to make. To make it on the basis of a contrast between so-called
home-grown programs and programs mandated from the top (of the IFIs or
the borrowing governments) just does not hold water. It displays an incom-
plete understanding of IFI lending programs over the past twenty years;
countries face external ﬁnancial or other deep-seated economic diﬃculties
and turn, with varying degrees of success, to the IFIs for ﬁnancial and pol-
icy assistance. Researchers will have to come to grips better with those re-
alities in their statistical analyses if they are to deal adequately with the
problem of selection bias in studies of this type.
IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 389Easterly is right that more careful and detailed research needs to be done
on these important matters, but I do not believe that his aggregate results
yet provide much of a useful guide for further research.
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Discussion Summary
Morris Goldstein suggested that the World Bank’s mandate was poverty re-
duction but that the IMF did not share this mandate. He therefore con-
cluded that it is not clear why IMF loans were included and why they should
be relevant to the poor.
Olivier Blanchard noted that there is a need to consider the elasticity of
poverty with respect to the trend and the cyclical component of growth sep-
arately. These might be diﬀerent, so this diﬀerentiation suggests a diﬀerent
explanation for the paper’s ﬁndings—possibly that cyclical growth has less
eﬀect on poverty rates.
Jeﬀrey  Shafer questioned why the paper assumed that the programs
should aﬀect poverty relative to economic growth. It is not within the IMF’s
mandate, after all. One needs, he noted, to examine whether there actually
is an eﬀect on poverty that is separate from the eﬀect on growth. In any case,
he concluded, there is a role for IFIs that is independent of their poverty re-
duction rhetoric.
Martin Feldstein pointed to the fact that the oﬃcial line of both institu-
tions is poverty reduction; therefore, it is essential to examine whether they
actually do what they say they do.
Jeﬀrey A. Frankel suggested that the IMF most likely mitigates down-
turns and increases long-run growth and only thus decreases poverty. While
one hopes all this is true, it remains unclear whether there is an eﬀect on in-
come distribution that is separate from the growth channel.
Lant Prichett, using the analogy of a sheriﬀ’s role in maintaining order,
argued that the IMF’s role should not be measured by its eﬀect on program
countries only but rather by its eﬀect on the international system of pay-
ments as a whole.
William Easterly responded that much of the criticism of the IMF and
World Bank claims that structural adjustment increases poverty, and so it is
390 William Easterlyrelevant to consider the eﬀect of adjustment loans on poverty both through
the growth channel and through other channels. He also stated that the re-
sults probably do not reﬂect the eﬀect of adjustment loans (ALs) on long-
run growth and poverty because the poverty spells measure used is mostly
for short-term data. He noted, as well, that opponents of the World Bank
and IMF might misuse these results but that this possibility should not
aﬀect research conducted even within those institutions.
Martin Eichenbaum and Edwin M. Truman suggested that instead of us-
ing program dummies it might prove fruitful to include the size of programs
(in absolute levels or per capita), because bigger programs should have
stronger eﬀects than very small ones. Michael Dooley concluded that if
cycles are symmetric and ALs are indeed cutting down volatility, then the
eﬀect is beneﬁcial for the poor.
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